-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: insecure handling of stdio file descriptors Category: core Module: kernel Announced: 2002-04-22 Credits: Joost Pol , Georgi Guninski Affects: All releases of FreeBSD up to and including 4.6-RELEASE 4.6-STABLE prior to the correction date Corrected: 2002-07-30 15:40:46 UTC (RELENG_4) 2002-07-30 15:42:11 UTC (RELENG_4_6) 2002-07-30 15:42:46 UTC (RELENG_4_5) 2002-07-30 15:43:17 UTC (RELENG_4_4) FreeBSD only: NO 0. Revision History v1.0 2002-04-22 Initial release v1.1 2002-04-23 Patch and revision numbers updated v1.2 2002-07-29 procfs issue; updated patch I. Background By convention, POSIX systems associate file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 with standard input, standard output, and standard error, respectively. Almost all applications give these stdio file descriptors special significance, such as writing error messages to standard error (file descriptor 2). In new processes, all file descriptors are duplicated from the parent process. Unless these descriptors are marked close-on-exec, they retain their state during an exec. All POSIX systems assign file descriptors in sequential order, starting with the lowest unused file descriptor. For example, if a newly exec'd process has file descriptors 0 and 1 open, but file descriptor 2 closed, and then opens a file, the new file descriptor is guaranteed to be 2 (standard error). II. Problem Description Some programs are set-user-id or set-group-id, and therefore run with increased privileges. If such a program is started with some of the stdio file descriptors closed, the program may open a file and inadvertently associate it with standard input, standard output, or standard error. The program may then read data from or write data to the file inappropriately. If the file is one that the user would normally not have privileges to open, this may result in an opportunity for privilege escalation. The original correction for this problem (corresponding to the first revision of this advisory) contained an error. Systems using procfs or linprocfs could still be exploited. The dates for the original, incomplete correction were: Corrected: 2002-04-21 13:06:45 UTC (RELENG_4) 2002-04-21 13:08:57 UTC (RELENG_4_5) 2002-04-21 13:10:51 UTC (RELENG_4_4) III. Impact Local users may gain superuser privileges. It is known that the `keyinit' set-user-id program is exploitable using this method. There may be other programs that are exploitable. IV. Workaround [FreeBSD systems earlier than 4.5-RELEASE-p4 and 4.4-RELEASE-p11] None. The set-user-id bit may be removed from `keyinit' using the following command, but note that there may be other programs that can be exploited. # chmod 0555 /usr/bin/keyinit [FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later, 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE] Unmount all instances of the procfs and linprocfs filesystems using the umount(8) command: # umount -f -a -t procfs # umount -f -a -t linprocfs V. Solution The kernel was modified to check file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 when starting a set-user-ID or set-group-ID executable. If any of these are not in use, they will be redirected to /dev/null. 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.6-STABLE; or to any of the RELENG_4_6 (4.6.1-RELEASE-p1), RELENG_4_5 (4.5-RELEASE-p10), or RELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p17) security branches dated after the respective correction dates. 2) To patch your present system: a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD systems earlier than 4.5-RELEASE-p4 and 4.4-RELEASE-p11] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2 # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2.asc [FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later, 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2 # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. Path Revision Branch - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- sys/sys/filedesc.h RELENG_4 1.19.2.4 RELENG_4_6 1.19.2.4 RELENG_4_5 1.19.2.3.6.1 RELENG_4_4 1.19.2.3.4.1 sys/kern/kern_exec.c RELENG_4 1.107.2.15 RELENG_4_6 1.107.2.14.2.1 RELENG_4_5 1.107.2.13.2.2 RELENG_4_4 1.107.2.8.2.3 sys/kern/kern_descrip.c RELENG_4 1.81.2.12 RELENG_4_6 1.81.2.14 RELENG_4_5 1.81.2.9.2.2 RELENG_4_4 1.81.2.8.2.2 sys/conf/newvers.sh RELENG_4_6 1.44.2.23.2.6 RELENG_4_5 1.44.2.20.2.11 RELENG_4_4 1.44.2.17.2.16 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References PINE-CERT-20020401 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (FreeBSD) iQCVAwUBPUbXw1UuHi5z0oilAQFgKQP/eOnmHorw/4NVEAEKTQp4+X7Px9p1wUGq 6OcLH5GuTbbwexd7KbCjbjzNZF7zgz1Qph2v7NQXb+W/ZaW2hEgcoURXkBomVxjl 61oXu72P35bmgNo7GQ794v/WDHd8FymtBv0kyY/vuZqg6l99tTuwi2ryV1ZszVrh w21lAbhkyQo= =YGVw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----